FROM DAMASCUS TO JERUSALEM: A SYRIAN'S CASE FLOR PEACE TALKS:
MURHAF JOUEJATI
By MURHAF JOUEJATI
It used to be that Israel was the one seeking peace and Syria the
one turning it down. Of late, however, it has been Damascus
extending the olive branch - and making a whole lot of people
scratch their heads. Is Syria serious about wanting to resume peace
talks? Should Israel shun Damascus's invitation, or should it
explore, if not exploit, this opportunity?
Israeli leaders are arguing that Syria is using the resumption of
talks as a ploy to dilute Washington's mounting pressure on
Damascus. Syrian officials, meanwhile, say they are reaching out to
Israel in large part because the United States seems to have
forfeited its role of honest broker in the region in general, and
toward Syria in particular. Washington's pressure on Prime Minister
Sharon to reject Syrian overtures - out of State Department fears
that Syrian-Israeli talks will sidetrack Israel's planned withdrawal
from Gaza and Defense Department insistence that Syria be held
accountable for its role in Iraq - is one case in point.
Whatever Syria's motivation in wanting to resume unconditional
bilateral talks with Israel, however, the bottom line is that
Damascus's offer represents a unique opportunity to advance the
cause of peace in the Middle East.
That Syria seeks a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict
should not be seen as the product of any love Syrians have for
Israel - they have none. Rather, Damascus wants peace with Israel
for the simple reason that peace is in Syria's national interest.
Syria's goal has been and continues to be the containment of Israel
within its 1967 boundaries. Given Israel's superior military power -
and few people in Syria harbor any doubts that Israel is militarily
superior to any combination of Arab power - Syria has come to
acknowledge that its goal cannot be achieved by force. This
no-nonsense assessment has been the cornerstone of Syria's Israel
policy since the collapse of Syria's superpower patron, the Soviet
Union. and it is on this premise that the late president Hafez Assad
engaged Israel in bilateral peace talks until his passing in 2000.
But even though this sober assessment might provide Israel with more
of a security guarantee than Israel's doctrine of military
superiority, Sharon continues to oppose the resumption of peace
talks with Syria, and this despite the advice of his top brass. From
a strictly balance of power standpoint, Sharon is right: Israel is
now so powerful that it need not resume talks, let alone withdraw
from the Golan Heights. Furthermore, Syria has scrupulously adhered
to the status quo for the past 30 years, and nothing suggests that
Syria will do things differently now. Syria is now weak, and
therefore not a threat to Israel. In these circumstances, why should
Israel give Syria anything?
The balance of power should rightly be the major consideration in
the strategic calculi of Israeli decision-makers. It should not,
however, be the only one.
With Syria calling for peace, it makes sense for Israel to seize the
opportunity, not out of Israeli affection for Syria - they have none
- but rather to accomplish what Israel has sought throughout its
embattled history: to be accepted in the region and to live within
secure and recognized boundaries, free from the threat of war.
Indeed, peace with Syria removes a major part of that threat. It is
worth remembering that during the Syrian-Israeli peace talks in
January 2000, Damascus accepted the principle of normalization of
relations, including the establishment of diplomatic relations
between the two states and the free flow of people and goods and
services across the border; a mutual security regime; and the
establishment of a joint water-sharing mechanism, which has critical
geopolitical implications. Over and above that, peace with Syria
opens the door to the normalization of relations between Israel and
all other Arab countries.
Moreover, despite its current weakness, Syria still holds many
important cards. Peace with Syria weakens Hezbollah and Hamas. Peace
with Syria neutralizes Iran. Peace with Syria also means that
Damascus could, for a price, be helpful in solving the thorny issue
of Palestinian refugees. If Israel plays its cards right and accepts
the land-for-peace equation, Syria might be willing to absorb the
roughly half-million Palestinian refugees residing in Syria.
Syria may also be able
to aid Israel in reaching a more favorable agreement on the
absorption of the approximately quarter-million Palestinian refugees
in Lebanon. While it would be difficult for Damascus to persuade
Beirut to resettle all of its Palestinian refugees, Syria wields
substantial clout in Lebanon. Such influence, however, may not last
for long, to judge by the growing pressure from Washington on Syria
to withdraw its troops.
If Syrian and Israeli leaders seize the opportunity, there is now a
chance for both peoples to live and let live. The current
convergence of interests could well mean that the two longtime
belligerents need not be locked in a warring relationship forever.
Murhaf Jouejati, an adjunct scholar at the Middle East
Institute and a visiting professor of political science and
international affairs at George Washington University, was an
advisor to the Syrian delegation during peace talks with Israel
between 1991 and 1996.
--
